A policy in search of a defence by Vermeersch, Peter
Consider crime. Selecting the Roma for
a highly publicised expulsion campaign
is not a particularly effective way of
preventing crime. Rather, it criminalises
them: they are collectively being held
responsible for one-off events not related
to their collective position as immigrants. 
Sarkozy’s policy plans were sparked,
back in July, by riots that followed a
shooting by police of a member of a
family of French Travellers. But there is
no link between the situation of these
gens du voyage, who maintain an
itinerant lifestyle, and the (non-itinerant)
eastern European Roma, who are fleeing
poverty at home and seeking opport-
unities abroad. The policy has constru-
cted links between disparate groups and
events, making every Roma and every
Traveller now guilty by association. That
does not increase feelings of security; it
increases insecurity.
Does the campaign, then, perhaps
discourage illegal immigration? Again
no. The eastern European Roma will
come back to France to seek jobs – just
as other citizens from the new member
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states have travelled back and forth
across the EU for the same reason. This
is what the EU is all about: offering its
citizens possibilities for socio-economic
mobility beyond the borders of the
nation-state. And Roma need exactly
that: more opportunities for socio-
economic mobility. There is no mystery
as to what would stop illegal Roma
migration: growing access to the labour
market. Expulsion has the opposite
effect. Some of the Roma expelled from
France had modestly begun integrating
into the labour market, albeit in irregular
and temporary positions. The current
policy does not provide incentives for
those Roma to try to turn their irregular
work into stable and official businesses. 
Previous mass expulsions of Roma
(sadly, this has a long tradition) have
shown that such policies only encourage
Roma to revert to a trusted method:
survival on the margins. And for the gens
du voyage, the expulsion campaign does
not, and cannot, have any effect. As
citizens of France they cannot be sent
away. The only way in which the French
government can diminish the number of
illicit encampments is to increase the
number of authorised sites.
Finally, will the expulsion policy impel
eastern European countries to take the
plight of their Roma populations more
seriously? French officials have now met
their Romanian and Bulgarian
counterparts, but this late move seems
nothing more than a weak response to
growing international indignation.
Why this policy, then? Is Sarkozy
trying to shore up his support on the
right at a critical time for his presidency?
And are the Roma just convenient, low-
cost victims? As a political tactic, the
policy might not be that successful
either: it has not so much bolstered his
approval ratings as created controversy
and prompted adversaries such as the
former prime minister Dominique de
Villepin to claim that there is now a stain
on the proud flag of republican France.
At the end of the day, this policy seems
mostly inspired by Marx. I mean
Groucho Marx. He once said: politics is
the art of looking for trouble, finding it
everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and
applying the wrong remedies.
T
he new politique sécuritaire
introduced by the French
government, which is
essentially a crackdown on
unemployed or non-legally
employed Roma immigrants from
Bulgaria and Romania, has been sharply
criticised because of its dubious legal and
moral grounds. The forced, or semi-
forced, collective expulsion of EU
citizens on the basis of their ethnic
identification clearly contravenes EU
laws and may even be a form of ethnic
discrimination.
France’s response has been defensive.
President Nicolas Sarkozy has tried to
reason his way out of the legal and moral
accusations by moving the debate to what
he sees as the policy’s positive outcomes.
The purpose of the campaign, so he
claims, is to increase security by reducing
crime rates, to discourage illegal
migration and, even, to push countries
such as Romania and Bulgaria to step up
their efforts to integrate their own Roma
populations. But on all these points his
policy completely misses the mark.
Don’t pretend the EU is the Red Cross
last year’s catastrophes to propose
significant reforms. It would, for
example, make sense to create a single
EU assessment team deployable to
disaster zones, reporting to all member
states; after the Haiti earthquake, EU
governments sent separate assessment
teams to Port-au-Prince. 
But Georgieva should resist the
temptation to Europeanise crisis
response for its own sake. Efforts to
strengthen EU capacities should not
come at the expense of efforts to reform
and develop the wider international
humanitarian system. 
That system – including UN agencies,
non-governmental organisations and the
Red Cross – has grown massively over the
past decade: today, there are 250,000
humanitarian workers worldwide,
compared to fewer than 150,000 in the
late 1990s. Aid delivery is also more
efficient, with the UN overhauling its
systems at the behest of European donors
such as the UK and Sweden.   
Even if emergency workers are not
“flying the EU flag”, the scale and
improvement in humanitarian assistance
today is a tribute to European policies. As
aid expert Abby Stoddard argues, these
European initiatives have often contrasted
with an “absence of high-level engage-
ment” by the US in reforming the intern-
ational aid system – despite the fact that
American humanitarian aid spending
represents nearly 50% of the global total.
The EU must ensure its system
remains closely connected to the UN’s
and that it continues to push for reform
of the international humanitarian system.
In Valerie Amos, the UK politician
recently appointed as the 
UN’s under-secretary general for
humanitarian affairs, Georgieva will find
an important potential ally not only in
reforms, but also in efforts to draw in
new donors, like India and Saudi Arabia.
Improving the EU’s and the
international community’s delivery of
humanitarian aid poses technical
challenges, but European leaders must
also recognise that ‘emergency response’
is rarely just a technical issue. Pakistan’s
floods are not only a human tragedy but
also a political problem, opening up
opportunities for the Taliban. Haiti’s
earthquake was a huge blow to UN-led
efforts to build a functioning state there.
The political neutrality of ‘pure’
humanitarian agencies, like the Red
Cross, allows them to operate in places
like Somalia, but aid delivery routinely
involves military hardware: the EU naval
force off Somalia’s coast protects the
UN’s food shipments, and in Afghanistan
NATO escorts the UN World Food
Programme’s aid convoys.
Handling complex emergencies
therefore requires more than
humanitarian aid. It demands military
hardware. And it demands civilian state-
builders, such as the policemen and
advisers that the EU has sent to the
Balkans and Afghanistan. 
Such support requires decisions by
politicians and political organisations.
Unlike the Red Cross, the EU is a
political organisation – and its capacity to
deal with the complex political aspects of
humanitarian crises suffers from deep
flaws. Its civilian state-building missions,
for example, are frequently 30%
understaffed. The EU’s goal of improving
humanitarian aid is laudable, but it needs
to focus on improving its political respo-
nse as much as its ability to deliver aid.
I
s the European Union good at
saving lives? This year, Haiti’s
earthquake, Pakistan’s floods and
Russia’s fires have stirred up
debate about how the EU delivers
crisis aid, with Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s
president, calling for the creation of a
European emergency response force.
In Brussels, officials complain that
although they play a leading role in
funding international humanitarian
operations, they don’t get enough credit
for it. Kristalina Georgieva, the European
commissioner for humanitarian aid,
argued in an August interview that 
EU-funded aid agencies should “do more
to help the EU by flying the EU flag”. 
Georgieva is now preparing proposals
on how to improve European responses
to crises. She may use the lessons of the
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REPATRIATION AHEAD
French police evict Roma
families from a camp
near Lille. REUTERS
